Is participatory budgeting a driving force behind excessive social welfare spending?
- Authors
- Jung, Sun-Moon; Kim, Bong Hwan
- Issue Date
- Dec-2025
- Publisher
- Taylor & Francis
- Keywords
- Participatory budgeting; social welfare spending; political competition; check and balances
- Citation
- Public Management Review, v.27, no.12, pp 2882 - 2907
- Pages
- 26
- Indexed
- SSCI
SCOPUS
- Journal Title
- Public Management Review
- Volume
- 27
- Number
- 12
- Start Page
- 2882
- End Page
- 2907
- URI
- https://scholarworks.dongguk.edu/handle/sw.dongguk/22677
- DOI
- 10.1080/14719037.2024.2380317
- ISSN
- 1471-9037
1471-9045
- Abstract
- Participatory Budgeting (PB) allows citizens to directly influence public fund allocation, often enhancing poverty reduction and administrative efficiency. This study explores PB's impact on social welfare spending in 214 Korean municipalities, identifying a significant increase in such expenditures post-PB adoption. The research highlights a potential overemphasis on social welfare spending due to PB, exceeding levels justified by socio-economic, political, and fiscal factors. It also shows that legislative checks, political pressures on mayors, and diverse political orientations can counterbalance the spending surge. The study cautions against a PB's disproportionate focus on social welfare, which might neglect other government functions. Participatory Budgeting (PB) carries the risk of excessive social welfare spending, potentially overshadowing other government priorities. To ensure a balanced and fiscally sustainable budgetary process, policymakers and practitioners should implement political checks and balances alongside PB initiatives. Striving for inclusiveness, diverse representation, and maintaining fiscal responsibility within PB programs are crucial for optimizing resource allocation and avoiding skewed government expenditure.
- Files in This Item
- There are no files associated with this item.
- Appears in
Collections - Dongguk Business School > Department of Accounting > 1. Journal Articles

Items in ScholarWorks are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.