비동일성 문제에서 행위 결과주의와 상식 도덕의 충돌: 미래에 존재할 수 있는 사람을 현재 존재하는 사람만큼 도덕적으로 고려해야 하는가?

A Conflict between Act Consequentialism and Common Sense Morality in the Non-Identity Problem: Should We Consider the Possible Future Person as Much as the Present Person?

초록

Act consequentialism and common sense morality conflict in the non-identity problem. Suppose that when different people exist depending on our choice, we can cause someone to exist whose quality of life is much higher than other possible future person by lowering some present person’s quality of life. Act consequentialist requires us to sacrifice the present person to cause the higher quality of life. In contrast, common sense morality tells us that it is wrong to treat the present person as a means to make things go best. If we fail to resolve this conflict, we never know how to consider the possible future people morally. Derek Parfit examines act consequentialism from rational and moral point of view to resolve their conflict. We argue that applying his solution to the non-identity problem, we can reduce the conflict but still we cannot clarify how to consider the possible future people morally.

키워드

비동일성 문제행위 결과주의상식 도덕데렉 파핏the Non-Identity ProblemAct ConsequentialismCommon Sense MoralityDerek Parfit
제목
비동일성 문제에서 행위 결과주의와 상식 도덕의 충돌: 미래에 존재할 수 있는 사람을 현재 존재하는 사람만큼 도덕적으로 고려해야 하는가?
제목 (타언어)
A Conflict between Act Consequentialism and Common Sense Morality in the Non-Identity Problem: Should We Consider the Possible Future Person as Much as the Present Person?
저자
조규범심지원
DOI
10.34162/hefins.2024..32.003
발행일
2024-04
저널명
인간.환경.미래
32
페이지
65 ~ 89