미국 연방대법원 셰브론 원칙 공식적 파기의 함의 - 재량행위 해석에 미치는 영향을 중심으로 -

초록

In June 2024, the U.S. Supreme Court formally overturned the Chevron deference principle in Loper Bright Enterprise v. Raimondo. Since the 1984 Chevron decision, this principle had been applied extensively across a wide range of areas and was the most frequently cited precedent in numerous cases. The ruling revises a legal doctrine central to debates over the legislative and executive branches' authority to interpret laws. The ruling places greater emphasis on the legislature's duty to ensure the clarity and precision of legislation. It also imposes a heavier burden of proof on the executive branch regarding major policies and law enforcement. The ruling is expected to bring significant changes to the judiciary, requiring stricter scrutiny in areas such as the environment, immigration, science, and technology. The points of contention between the majority and minority opinions are as follows: First, regarding Article III of the Federal Constitution, the majority opinion emphasizes that the courts are the ultimate interpreters of the law. In contrast, the minority opinion argues that Congress intentionally enacts ambiguous statutes. While the courts should interpret statutes based on the executive branch's expertise, such interpretations can be judged for reasonableness. Second, regarding a potential conflict with the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, the majority opinion asserts that courts must adjudicate even ambiguous statutes. Section 706 of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act stipulates that abuse of discretion is determined based on substantial evidence; however, it does not require evidence-based adjudication for legal issues. Therefore, the Chevron principle cannot be applied to legal issue adjudication. Furthermore, the majority opinion explains that: (1) when a statute is ambiguous, the agency's interpretation is respected without assessing the degree of specificity if it presents a permissible legal interpretation, (2) statutory ambiguity is treated as an implied delegation, (3) it is applied broadly, even in areas unrelated to the agency's expertise, and (4) although the Supreme Court has scarcely addressed it since 2016, lower courts cite it when litigants raise it. In contrast, the dissenting opinion argues that, although the Federal Administrative Procedure Act stipulates that all legal issues are subject to review, it does not prescribe a specific standard of review. Therefore, it can be reviewed under the reasonableness standard. The dissent contended that the Chevron doctrine alone is insufficient to justify changing Supreme Court precedent and that the majority opinion lacks grounds to alter established case law. Following the Supreme Court ruling, it was suggested that the Chevron doctrine indicated a return to literalism and strict construction. It was also said that the doctrine restored judicial discretion by interpreting Article III of the Constitution expansively. Additionally, the notion that Congress implicitly delegates authority to the executive branch despite lacking constitutional or statutory authorization was deemed a fiction. Some argue that the inherent flaws of the Chevron doctrine mean it no longer warrants deference, and that the Skidmore doctrine will be emphasized instead. Others argue that even if the Chevron doctrine is discarded, Section 706(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act can be applied based on criteria such as “arbitrariness, abuse of discretion, illegality,” and “whether evidence exists.” Some argue that the Supreme Court overturned the doctrine merely to clarify that lower courts no longer need apply the Chevron standard, which has no impact on general cases but may be interpreted based on a judge's ideology in difficult cases. Others argue that the doctrine is a precedent that imposes an excessive burden on Congress. The formal abandonment of the Chevron doctrine can be discussed in the following areas. First, regarding the scope of delegated legislation, the limitations of interpreting the “all-reservation theory” and the “reservation of important matters theory” as legislative technical constraints in areas such as the environment, technology, and policy decisions are likely to be a subject of ongoing debate. While not comparable to the U.S. debate (where delegation itself is absent or laws are unclear even in areas infringing fundamental rights), future advancements in AI technology may raise questions about the extent to which a prior legislative obligation should be imposed for areas where “relevance to fundamental rights, degree of regulation or infringement, etc.” cannot be clearly predicted in advance. Even if the legislative obligation is fulfilled, the appropriateness of using abstract terms to effect a formal re-delegation will likely require case-by-case review. Second, the scope of judicial review in interpreting specialized domains may be debated. For example, While definitive concepts like “deadlines, delegation, entrustment, cancellation, revocation, etc.” can specify content, in cases involving indeterminate concepts such as “public interest, gross negligence, necessary measures, significant reasons, etc.,” judicial review may be limited when dealing with discretionary choices (e.g., selecting factors for balancing interests or choosing the most public-interest- aligned means among multiple options) rather than decisions involving pure discretion (e.g., determining the existence of public interest). Elements of judicial review include “whether procedures were followed, whether heterogeneous considerations were involved, the principle of equality, the principle of proportionality, etc.” Regarding the scope of judgment, “abuse of judgment, deviation from judgment, and failure to exercise judgment” are considered. Proposals include adopting the Chevron standard as a method for judicial review and establishing a minimum check mechanism for the judiciary to oversee policy judgments or public interest determinations. Third, an increase in administrative litigation is anticipated. In the United States, the abandonment of the Chevron principle imposes a greater burden of proof on administrative agencies in legal interpretation, while requiring courts to conduct independent and rigorous review even in specialized fields. Litigation challenging such deficiencies is expected to rise. While an increase in litigation over administrative interpretations is already emerging in Korea, the continuous emergence of new domains like the environment and technology will demand specialized judicial judgment. Administrative agencies will likely face stricter evidentiary burdens in enacting administrative legislation and interpreting statutes. Fourth, although there are differences with Korea in terms of the subject matter of appeals, the scope of litigation concerning the interpretation of discretionary acts is also expected to expand in the United States.

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