Security Policy Similarity and Sanction Treat and Imposition

Security Policy Similarity and Sanction Treat and Imposition

초록

Prior studies have explained how dyad-level factors affect a sender state’s sanction threat and imposition decision. However, although security is one of states’ important goals, prior studies have little explained how security issues at the dyad level affect the likelihood of sanction threat and imposition. Thus, this study analyzes how two states’ security policy similarity based on their alliance portfolios affects sanction threat and imposition. This study suggests a testable hypothesis that an increase in two states’ security policy similarity increases the likelihood of sanction threat by increasing the likelihood of an interest conflict. However, two states’ security policy similarity does not affect the likelihood of sanction imposition due to high expected costs of sanction imposition and more complete information situations. Empirical results in this study support this argument.

키워드

Sanction threatSanction impositionSecurity policy similarityAlliance portfolioHeckman probit model경제제재 위협경제제재 부과안보정책 유사도동맹 정책헤크먼 프로빗 모형
제목
Security Policy Similarity and Sanction Treat and Imposition
제목 (타언어)
Security Policy Similarity and Sanction Treat and Imposition
저자
우정무
DOI
10.46415/jss.2019.12.26.4.7
발행일
2019-12
저널명
사회과학연구
26
4
페이지
7 ~ 30