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초록

We develop a game-theoretic model of two-candidate elections in which voters are concerned with the consistency of candidates' political positions as well as their valence characteristics unrelated to policy positions. We examine two versions of the model: One in which candidates aim to maximize their vote shares and the other in which they seek to maximize their probability of winning amid valence uncertainty. In the game with vote motivation, a unique pure-strategy equilibrium exists when the valence asymmetry is not too large. The higher-valence candidate chooses a more centrist platform than the disadvantaged candidate. In the game with win motivation, despite platform divergence due to costs of flip-flopping, both candidates aim for the median voter. Departing from previous research, both games predict that platform divergence is not linked to valence advantage and that a close electoral competition does not equate to platform convergence. Lastly, we investigate how the results carry over to, or change in, more general settings.

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