『유가론기(瑜伽論記)』에 나타난 현장(玄奘)의 학문적 위상

초록

One of Xuanzang’s most significant scholarly achievements was his complete translation and exposition of the Yogācārabhūmi-Śāstra. Through this work, he not only deepened understanding of the text but also stimulated scholarly interest in Buddhist logic (Hetuvidyā), a branch of Yogācāra philosophy. This influence is known primarily through indirect accounts transmitted by the first-generation scholars of the Yogācārabhūmi-Śāstra. This paper examines Xuanzang’s intellectual standing by analyzing Dunlun’s Yogācārabhūmi Commentary (瑜伽論記), which consolidates earlier scholarly interpretations. In particular, it focuses on two representative examples from the section “Saṅgraha-prayukta-vibhāga” (攝決擇分), revealing Xuanzang’s methodological depth. The first concerns his interpretation of the Five Types of Natures. The concept of “no-nature”—which posits the existence of beings without the potential for enlightenment—provoked prolonged controversy among Tang dynasty monks. Xuanzang offered two distinct explanations. According to him, “no-nature” may refer either to a bodhisattva who possesses the potential for Buddhahood but chooses not to enter nirvāṇa in order to save sentient beings, as described in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra; or to an individual who inherently lacks the capacity for nirvāṇa, as explained in the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra, and thus cannot attain Buddhahood even under favorable conditions. This interpretation has continued to shape subsequent Buddhist discourse on “no-nature.” The second example is Xuanzang’s application of vijñaptimātra inference. As presented in the Commentary, this inference occupies a circumscribed role within Yogācāra teachings grounded in ālaya-vijñāna. Xuanzang’s argument indirectly affirms the existence of ālaya-vijñāna through an epistemological proposition: when discriminative cognition of a visual object arises, ālaya-vijñāna and manas simultaneously generate awareness of the world of vessels, the body, and the self. This demonstrates that all dharmas are inseparable from consciousness. In particular, Xuanzang challenges the Hīnayāna position by asserting that a visual object perceived by visual consciousness cannot exist independently of that consciousness —thereby firmly establishing his vijñaptimātra inference.

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