정책목표 유입이 국민연금 운용목표에 미치는 영향: IPS 독립성 원칙의 규범적 해석과 거버넌스 취약성 분석

초록

This paper examines controversies over the policy use of Korea’s National Pension Fund(NPF) not by adjudicating the legitimacy of particular episodes, but by diagnosing a governance vulnerability through which policy objectives can enter the fund’s investment judgment and objective function even without explicit directives. The paper conceptualizes this phenomenon as New Dirigisme, distinguishing it from classic state-directed finance that operates via overt commands and forced credit allocation. Building on agency theory and the dynamic inconsistency framework, the analysis identifies a persistent gap between the normative architecture of the NPF’s Investment Policy Statement (IPS)—which prioritizes long-term, risk-adjusted return maximization for beneficiaries—and the realities of agenda-setting, decision-making, and accountability in fund governance. To clarify the boundary between legitimate ESG integration and policy instrumentalization, the paper proposes a normative criterion that separates financial materiality from policy instrumentality. Policy-objective inflow is defined as a condition in which policy aims are repeatedly agendaized, justifications lacking financial materiality become normalized, and such justifications are internalized as routine decision criteria (objective drift). The analysis shows that the current governance framework is especially fragile at the stages of agenda formation and accountability: political credit for short-term policy outcomes tends to accrue to the incumbent government, while financial costs and opportunity losses can be shifted to future contributors and beneficiaries over time. The paper concludes by proposing a “three-layer firewall” against New Dirigisme: (1) a procedural double-lock system for policy-linked agenda items, (2) statutory fiscal compensation when profitability is impaired for policy reasons, and (3) reforms to strengthen de facto independence and expertise in governance structures.

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