『유가사지론약찬(瑜伽師地論略纂)』에 나타난 규기(窺基)의 유식비량(唯識比量)

초록

This paper examines the significance of Vijñaptimātratā inference (唯識比量) as presented in Kuiji’s commentary on the “Section on Determinations” (攝決擇分) of Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra. Kuiji actively employed Dignāga’s three-part syllogism analyzing eight theses that establish the existence of the ālaya-vijñāna. In particular, while addressing the fifth thesis, he introduced his own Vijñaptimātratā inference to affirm the doctrine of “everything is consciousness”. The fifth thesis asserts that unless the simultaneous arising of multiple types of consciousness is accepted, four distinct cognitive functions—discriminating the external natural world, one’s own body, the self, and objects such as form (rūpa)—cannot be established. This argument indirectly affirms the existence of the ālaya-vijñāna by logically responding to counterarguments from other Buddhist schools. Kuiji further constructs a rebuttal by anticipating objections from the Hīnayāna perspective, thereby demonstrating that only the simultaneous emergence of multiple consciousnesses can account for the four differentiated cognitive functions. Furthermore, Kuiji demonstrates that his rebuttal arguments ultimately converge on his own Vijñaptimātratā inference, which establishes the doctrine of “everything is consciousness”. According to the theory of the eight consciousnesses, the ālaya-vijñāna, relying on karmic seeds, manifests and cognizes the external natural world and one’s physical body. The manas-vijñāna, depending on the subjective aspect (darśanabhāga) of the ālaya-vijñāna, manifests and cognizes the image of the self. The six consciousnesses, relying on the objective aspect (nimitta-bhāga) of the ālaya-vijñāna, manifest and cognize their respective objects. In this framework, all phenomena (dharmas) are inseparable from consciousness. The necessity of positing both ālaya-vijñāna and manas-vijñāna to account for the discrimination of the external world, the body, and the self is substantiated by Kuiji’s rebuttal arguments. However, the Hīnayāna tradition, while acknowledging that the six consciousnesses discriminate objects such as material dharmas, does not accept that these objects are inseparable from consciousness. To address this, Kuiji cites Xuanzang’s Vijñaptimātratā inference as a logical proof to establish the inseparability of object and consciousness.

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