The Size of Veto Players in a Sender State and the Duration of Economic Sanctions

Abstract

Prior studies have explained how domestic political constraints in either a sender or target state affect the imposition and effectiveness of economic sanctions. However, although the duration of economic sanctions is an important indicator of the sanctions efficiency, they have little explained how domestic political constraints in either a sender or target state affect the duration of economic sanctions. To analyze the impact of domestic political constraints in a sender state on the duration of economic sanctions, this study employs the concept of veto players. This study suggests a testable hypothesis that an increase in the size of veto players in a sender state reduces the duration of an economic sanctions episode. This is because a larger size of veto players allows some domestic actors in a sender state, who should bear economic losses incurred by economic sanctions, to have more opportunities to persuade a veto player to terminate the imposition of economic sanctions. Empirical results support this hypothesis.