External control mechanisms and red tape: testing the roles of external audit and evaluation on red tape in quasi-governmental organizations

Abstract

Over the past three decades, red tape has been a significant issue in public administration. Several prior studies have discovered the external origins of red tape, noting the roles of external control on increased red tape. Despite the empirical studies, it remains unclear how the particular tools of external controls, such as external audits and evaluations, are associated with employees' perception of red tape. To answer this question, we measured different external control mechanisms in quasi-governmental organizations in Korea and investigated their effects on red-tape perception. The results show that external audits increase employees' red-tape perception, whereas external evaluations decrease their perception. However, the positive function of evaluation disappears under a high level of government control because both external audits and evaluations increase red-tape perception when more government control is perceived. Points for practitioners This study sheds theoretical light on the negative impacts of external control in rule management. The impacts of audit and evaluation on red tape are empirically identified in public organizations. Practitioners need to realize that the use of audit and evaluation may produce unintended effects that increase ineffective rules even though such control mechanisms are designed to check mismanagement in quasi-government organizations.